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This report describes a joint measles outbreak inves-
tigation between public health officials in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands following detec-
tion of a measles cluster with a unique measles virus 
strain. From 1 February to 30 April 2014, 33 measles 
cases with a unique measles virus strain of genotype 
B3 were detected in the UK and the Netherlands, of 
which nine secondary cases were epidemiologically 
linked to an infectious measles case travelling from 
the Philippines. Through a combination of epidemio-
logical investigation and sequence analysis, we found 
that measles transmission occurred in flight, airport 
and household settings. The secondary measles cases 
included airport workers, passengers in transit at the 
same airport or travelling on the same flight as the 
infectious case and also household contacts. This 
investigation highlighted the particular importance 
of measles genotyping in identifying transmission 
networks and the need to improve vaccination, public 
health follow-up and management of travellers and 
airport staff exposed to measles.
Introduction
Measles is a highly contagious, acute viral illness with 
potential for severe complications, including pneumo-
nia, encephalitis and death. The infectious period for 
measles is from four days before until four days after 
rash onset [1]. International travel by susceptible per-
sons to measles-endemic areas can lead to imported 
sporadic cases in countries that have achieved or are 
close to achieving measles elimination [2,3]. Many of 
these sporadic cases result from measles transmis-
sion in flight or at airports [3-7]. Risk of further trans-
mission following an importation then depends on the 
level of immunity in the exposed population and the 
responsiveness of public health agencies once a case 
is identified.
In 2014, 48 laboratory-confirmed measles importations 
were reported in the United Kingdom (UK) compared 
with 50 in 2013 and 27 in 2012. In the Netherlands in 
2014, nine laboratory-confirmed measles importations 
were reported, compared with 31 in 2013 and eight in 
2012. Vaccination coverage for two doses of the mea-
sles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine is high in both the 
UK (88.3%) [8] and the Netherlands (92.4%) [9]. Their 
respective national immunisation programmes offers 
two doses of the MMR vaccine at 14 months and nine 
years in the Netherlands [10] and between 12 and 13 
months and then between three years four months and 
five years in England [11]. Two doses of the MMR vac-
cine are 99% effective at preventing measles [1].
Heathrow Airport in London in the UK and Amsterdam 
Airport Schiphol in the Netherlands are the first and 
fourth busiest airports in Europe, handling ca 72.3 mil-
lion and 52.6 million passengers respectively in 2013 
[12,13]. As a consequence, these large airports present 
opportunities for measles importation and transmis-
sion, posing additional challenges for measles elimina-
tion in Europe [14].
In the event of an infectious measles case travelling on 
a flight, European risk assessment guidelines for infec-
tious diseases transmitted on aircraft (RAGIDA), pub-
lished by the European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control (ECDC), recommend that contact trac-
ing should prioritise children aged below 2 years 
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and passengers seated in the same row as the index 
case. Contact tracing should then proceed row by row 
in either direction away from the index case, in an 
effort to identify vulnerable susceptible contacts on 
the entire flight. Timeliness is crucial in these situa-
tions, as post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) with either 
vaccine or immunoglobulin needs to be administered 
within a few days of exposure [15]. In the UK and the 
Netherlands, the policy for PEP is similar to the ECDC 
RAGIDA guidelines [10,11].
A cluster of measles cases with onset dates from 1 
February to 30 April 2014 occurred in the UK and the 
Netherlands and was linked to an index case that trav-
elled from the Philippines to London, via Amsterdam 
Airport Schiphol, in January 2014. At this time, a large 
measles outbreak was ongoing in the Philippines. 
Although the measles cluster was only recognised 
when genotype information on the third UK case 
became available, we present the key epidemiological 
features and lessons learnt from the investigation and 
management of this cluster.
Methods
Case definition
Measles is a notifiable disease in both the UK and the 
Netherlands. In the UK, a suspected case of measles 
includes any person in whom a clinician suspects mea-
sles infection, or any person with a clinically compat-
ible rash and fever illness [16]. In the Netherlands, the 
European Union (EU) measles case definition is used 
[17]. In all cases, samples are requested from suspect 
cases (oral fluid samples for detection of measles 
IgM and/or viral RNA in the UK; oral fluids or naso-
pharyngeal aspirate specimens for IgM serology and/
or detection of viral RNA in the Netherlands) to con-
firm the diagnosis. In this investigation, the outbreak 
case definition included laboratory-confirmed cases 
of measles notified between 1 February and 1 June 
2014 with the measles virus MVs/Tonbridge.GBR/5.14 
[B3] (i.e. an identical 450 nucleotide (nt) sequence) or 
laboratory-confirmed measles cases without genotyp-
ing but with a clear epidemiological link to cases with 
the measles virus MVs/Tonbridge.GBR/5.14 [B3].
Laboratory investigation
Serum or oral fluid samples were tested by commer-
cial serological assay for measles IgM and IgG using 
standard methods. PCR testing and genotyping of oral 
fluid and or nasopharyngeal aspirates were conducted 
by the Virus Reference Department (VRD) at Public 
Health England (PHE) and by the Centre for Infectious 
Disease Research, Diagnostics and Screening at the 
Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment (RIVM). Genotyping and strain identifi-
cation is attempted on all confirmed measles cases. 
Measles genotyping involves amplification of the 
450 nt fragment of the measles nucleocapsid (N) 
gene. Classification of genotypes is based on nucleic 
acid sequencing of the PCR products [18]. Measles 
sequences were entered and compared against other 
measles sequences in the World Health Organization 
(WHO) measles nucleotide surveillance database 
(MeaNS, http://www.who-measles.org), hosted by the 
VRD at PHE [19].
Public health investigation and response
PHE is responsible for the investigation and public 
health management of measles cases and contacts in 
England. PHE interviewed the index case immediately 
after notification and PEP was offered to susceptible 
household contacts of the case. As the index case 
was infectious during air travel, PHE contacted the air-
line for passenger contact tracing. The airline initially 
declined to provide the passenger and crew member 
list to PHE but agreed to send a letter to passengers 
and crew members on the flight between Amsterdam 
Airport Schiphol and Heathrow Airport. The letter noti-
fied them about the potential measles exposure and 
recommended that they contact PHE or their local 
health service if they were pregnant, had a weakened 
immune system, travelled with an infant less than 6 
months old, or had developed symptoms compatible 
with measles. PHE also notified the Dutch International 
Health Regulation Focal Point (IHRFP) about possi-
ble exposures during the transit of the index case at 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol.
The RIVM laboratory shared genotype and epidemio-
logical information with the WHO MeaNS network 
about two geographically separate clusters of the out-
break strain that were identified in March 2014. RIVM 
alerted Municipal Health Services in regions of the 
Netherlands with measles cases to conduct enhanced 
surveillance. Subsequent cases were captured, con-
firmed and sequenced.
Following the identification of multiple unlinked cases 
with the measles virus MVs/Tonbridge.GBR/5.14 in the 
UK and the Netherlands, epidemiological links between 
UK and Dutch cases were further investigated. All pos-
sible related cases in both the UK and the Netherlands 
Figure 1
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with the measles virus MVs/Tonbridge.GBR/5.14 were 
interviewed to look for common links.
Results
Index case
The index case in this cluster (UK1) was an unvaccinated 
adult aged 45–49 years, born in the Philippines, but 
currently resident in the UK. Between December 2013 
and January 2014, UK1 spent two consecutive months 
visiting family and friends in Manila, the Philippines. 
While in Manila, UK1 became unwell and developed a 
rash in week 5 2014, the day before returning to the UK. 
UK1 sought medical attention in Manila, but measles 
was not suspected. UK1 departed Manila for Heathrow 
Airport the following day, transiting via Taiwan Taoyuan 
International Airport and Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, 
before arriving in the UK on the second day after rash 
Figure 2
Possible point of exposure and chain of transmission among measles cases in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, 
week 5 to week 8 2014
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onset. The index case spent approximately five hours 
at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol during transit. Due to 
deterioration of symptoms, UK1 attended a local hos-
pital the day after arrival in the UK (day 3 after rash 
onset), where measles was clinically suspected.
Laboratory results
The diagnosis of UK1 was confirmed by serology (IgM) 
and detection of the virus by PCR two days after hos-
pital attendance in week 6 2015. Sequencing results 
showed that UK1 had been infected with a unique 
measles virus strain of genotype B3, MVs/Tonbridge.
GBR/5.14, (GenBank KJ650198). The sequence differed 
by two nucleotides from the Harare B3 sequence (Mvi/
Harare.ZWE/38.09), which by February 2014 had been 
associated with measles outbreaks in many countries, 
including the Philippines [20]. On 6 February 2014, the 
sequence was submitted to the WHO MeaNS database. 
At that time, there were no identical sequences avail-
able in either GenBank or MeaNS. With the identifica-
tion of other cases with the same 450 nt sequence, this 
sequence was assigned as a new measles strain type, 
MVs/Tonbridge.GBR/5.14, (referred to in this report as 
the outbreak strain).
Overview of contacts
Following identification of UK1, a further 17 cases in the 
UK that met the outbreak case definition were identi-
fied between week 7 and week 12 2014. Of these 17 UK 
cases, 16 had the outbreak strain, and one case was 
not sequenced but had clear epidemiological links to 
the index case. Seven cases with the outbreak strain in 
the UK could be epidemiologically linked to UK1 (Figure 
1).
Six of these UK cases (UK3–UK8) were found to have 
transited through or travelled from Amsterdam Airport 
Schiphol on the same date or flight as UK1, while one 
case (UK2) was a household contact of the index case 
(Figure 2). The remaining 10 UK cases with the out-
break strain identified through surveillance activities 
were investigated, but could not be epidemiologically 
or directly linked to UK1.
In the Netherlands, 15 cases met the outbreak case def-
inition and were identified between week 7 and week 
14 2014. Two secondary cases (NL1 and NL2) could be 
epidemiologically linked to UK1 (Figure 1) and worked 
at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (Figure 2). Four measles 
cases with the outbreak strain lived in the same com-
munity as NL2, near Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. The 
remaining nine cases with the outbreak strain occurred 
in The Hague, and no formal epidemiological link with 
UK1 was established. An overview of cases linked to 
UK1, of whom six were male and three were female, is 
shown in Table 1.
Secondary and tertiary measles cases with the 
outbreak strain in the United Kingdom
UK2 was a household contact of UK1 during their infec-
tious period in the UK. UK2 was an unvaccinated adult 
aged 45–49 years, with no history of recent travel out-
side of the UK. UK2 received a post-exposure MMR vac-
cination within 24 hours following contact with UK1, 
but developed measles rash 15 days post exposure.
UK3 was an unvaccinated infant aged <  1 year old 
returning from a country in southern Africa to the UK 
via Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. UK3 was on the same 
flight as UK1 from Amsterdam to London and was 
seated on a parent’s lap. UK3 developed measles rash 
13 days post exposure.
UK4 was an unvaccinated child aged 1–3 years return-
ing from a country in southern Africa to the UK via 
Figure 3
Aircraft seating plan showing the index case and 
secondary cases on the flight from Amsterdam Airport 
Schiphol to Heathrow Airport (D0), week 5 2014
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Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. While not genotyped, 
UK4 had rash onset 14 days post exposure, which is 
consistent with acquisition of infection on the flight 
or at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, rather than in the 
household setting.
UK5 was an unvaccinated infant <  1 year old and a 
sibling of UK4. UK5 was also on the same flight as 
UK1 from Amsterdam to London, and was seated in a 
bassinet. UK5 developed measles rash 19 days post 
exposure.
UK6 was an unvaccinated infant aged <  1 year old 
returning from a country in southern Africa. UK6 was 
on the same flight as UK1 from Amsterdam to London, 
and seated on a parent’s lap. UK6 developed measles 
rash 14 days post exposure.
Of the four UK secondary cases (UK3, UK4, UK5, UK6) 
who were on the same flight as UK1, only one case 
was seated within one row of UK1, while the remaining 
three cases were seated near the rear of the plane, six 
to seven rows from UK1 (Figure 3).
The remaining two secondary cases, an unvaccinated 
infant aged <  1 year old (UK7) and an unvaccinated 
adult aged 45–49 years (UK8) were not on the same 
flight as UK1. However, both cases were in transit at 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol on the same day as UK1. 
UK7 was en route to the Caribbean and had flown with 
the same airline as UK1, and used the same gate area. 
UK7 developed a measles rash 13 days post exposure. 
UK8 was flying from Amsterdam Airport Schiphol to 
Gatwick Airport in the UK but had flown with a different 
airline from a different gate. UK8 developed measles 
rash 15 days post exposure.
The ten UK cases, who were infected with the out-
break strain but were not epidemiologically linked to 
the index case, were in the age range of <  1 year and 
49 years. Nine cases were not known to have travelled 
abroad, with five cases clustered in Newcastle and two 
cases clustered in a different area of the country. One 
measles case had been on a cruise ship in Italy in late 
February 2014, which reported a measles outbreak 
with the same outbreak strain [21].
Secondary and tertiary measles cases with the 
outbreak strain in the Netherlands
In March 2014, RIVM identified measles cases with the 
same outbreak strain among two Amsterdam Airport 
Schiphol workers (Table 1). The outbreak strain was 
first identified in the Netherlands in an Amsterdam 
Airport Schiphol worker (NL1) aged 25–29 years. NL1 
had received a single dose of monovalent measles vac-
cine and two doses of MMR vaccine in the past. NL1 
had measles rash onset 18 days post exposure. NL1 
worked at the airport on the morning that UK1 was in 
transit.
The second outbreak strain case was an Amsterdam 
Airport Schiphol worker aged 35–39 years (NL2) who 
had received one dose of MMR vaccine in the past. NL2 
had measles rash onset 16 days post exposure and was 
hospitalised for four days due to general malaise and 
rash. NL2 was the only case in this cluster to require 
hospitalisation.
Between week 11 and week 14 2014, an additional four 
measles cases with the outbreak strain were detected 
in the community where NL2 lived, which was close to 
the airport. All four cases were unvaccinated and in the 
age range of 15 to 44 years.
Table 
Summary of measles cases in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands linked to air travel and transit at Amsterdam 
Airport Schiphol, week 5 to week 8 2014 (n=10)
Case number Age (given as range) Number of days post-exposure to rash onset Measles vaccination status Transmission setting
UK1 (index 
case) 45–49 years D0 0 doses Unknown
UK2 45–49 years 15 1 post-exposure MMR Household contact
UK3 <1 year 13 0 doses Airport/same flight
UK4 a 1–3 years 14 0 doses Airport/same flight
UK5 <1 year 19 0 doses Airport/same flight
UK6 <1 year 14 0 doses Airport/same flight
UK7 <1 year 13 0 doses Airport
UK8 45–49 years 15 0 doses Airport
NL1 25–29 years 18 1 monovalent measles vaccine and 2 MMR doses Airport
NL2 35–39 years 16 1 MMR dose Airport
MMR: measles-mumps-rubella vaccine.
a Not genotyped, rash onset date consistent with acquisition of infection on the flight or at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol.
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The remaining nine Dutch cases with the outbreak strain 
but not epidemiologically linked to the index case were 
aged between < 1 year and 44 years. These cases were 
involved in two separate cluster events in The Hague. 
Five cases with the outbreak strain were involved in a 
kindergarten measles cluster. We were unable obtain 
information relating to recent travel. However, four of 
the five cases reported that the source of infection 
was at the kindergarten. Four cases were involved in a 
hospital measles cluster. Two of these four cases had 
a history of recent travel, but travelled after onset of 
measles symptoms.
Discussion
This report describes measles transmission in multi-
ple settings in the UK and the Netherlands linked to 
an infectious traveller returning from the Philippines. 
Secondary transmission occurred firstly in passengers 
in transit and workers at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol; 
secondly, to passengers before or during a flight from 
the Netherlands to the UK and thirdly, in the household 
setting of the index case in the UK. One secondary case 
required hospitalisation due to general malaise and 
rash. Tertiary transmission occurred in the Netherlands 
in a community close to the airport. Additional cases 
with the outbreak strain were also identified in both 
the UK and the Netherlands, but could not be epide-
miologically linked. We did not follow up other passen-
gers potentially exposed on the Manila to Taipei and 
Taipei to Amsterdam flights, as there was no efficient 
method known to contact potentially exposed pas-
sengers. Therefore, there may have been additional or 
unreported cases linked to this cluster in the UK and 
the Netherlands.
The index case in this cluster developed measles in 
the Philippines, having spent two months there before 
departure to the UK, and where a large measles out-
break was ongoing [20,22]. Historically, the measles 
genotypes in clade B have been associated with sub–
Saharan Africa [19,23], but genotype B3 is now widely 
distributed throughout the world, and associated with 
many outbreaks [24-26]. However, the outbreak strain 
we describe in this cluster had not been previously 
reported. The ability to identify the outbreak strain in 
the UK and subsequently in the Netherlands confirms 
the utility of having timely submission of sequences 
to the WHO MeaNS database. Exchange of informa-
tion regarding epidemiological risk and exposures 
between the public health authorities in the UK and the 
Netherlands made it possible to link the cases in the 
Netherlands to the index case.
In a separate event in late February 2014, a measles 
outbreak on a cruise ship in Italy reported cases with 
the same strain [21]. At the time of reporting of this 
cruise ship outbreak, the only reference for this unique 
B3 sequence type was that of UK1. No epidemiologi-
cal link was identified between UK1 and the cruise 
ship outbreak [27]. A UK case with the outbreak strain 
who had been on the cruise ship was later identified 
in March 2014. Three measles cases on the cruise 
ship outbreak were from the Philippines [21], which 
suggests the circulation of the novel B3 strain in the 
Philippines in early 2014.
Four UK cases in this cluster who were at the same air-
port or on the same flight as the index case were aged 
under 12 months and were not yet eligible for routine 
MMR vaccination in England [11]. Young unvaccinated 
children are at increased risk of measles and its compli-
cations [1]. Given the risk of measles while travelling to 
countries with endemic or epidemic transmission, cur-
rent national recommendations in both the UK and the 
Netherlands advise that children aged over 6 months 
of age should be considered for an early dose of MMR 
vaccine before travel [10,11]. The data from this report 
suggests that infants travelling through major inter-
national hubs are at risk of measles infection and an 
early MMR vaccination should be considered by their 
parents or guardians.
Four adult cases (UK1, UK2, UK8, and NL2) were unvac-
cinated or had received only a single MMR vaccine. 
This represents a susceptible group of adults who were 
either not exposed to measles during childhood or 
were not fully vaccinated in routine MMR vaccination 
programmes. Measles is still endemic in many coun-
tries and measles outbreaks are occurring on a global 
scale [28]. It is therefore important that travellers 
obtain appropriate advice when travelling, to ensure 
that they are fully protected against measles and other 
vaccine-preventable diseases.
In this cluster, two measles cases were airport work-
ers at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. In a separate mea-
sles cluster in the Netherlands in January and February 
2014, two other airport workers at Amsterdam Airport 
Schiphol, who were both unvaccinated and required 
hopsitalisation for measles complications, were found 
to have a genotype B3 strain identical to the MVi/
Harare.ZWE/38.09 strain. Additional cases with the 
MVi/Harare.ZWE/38.09 strain were detected in their 
communities, indicating possible tertiary transmission. 
In 2013 and 2014, this strain was detected in cases 
imported from the Philippines into Canada, Japan and 
the United States, and in 10 cases in the UK [24-26]. 
Staff at large international airports risk possible expo-
sure to infectious diseases from travellers. Therefore, 
in order to prevent the spread of measles, occupational 
health departments at airports could consider check-
ing the vaccination status of airport workers to ensure 
they are fully vaccinated.
The recommendation by RAGIDA to prioritise contact 
tracing among those under 2 years of age is well-jus-
tified [15]. In this report, four of the secondary cases 
who contracted measles met these criteria for prior-
itisation. However, the RAGIDA recommendation to 
prioritise contact tracing of the remaining passengers 
by proximity to the index case may not be sufficiently 
sensitive for a highly communicable infection such as 
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measles. Firstly, measles exposure may have occurred 
in flight, while waiting at the gate or during the board-
ing process. Secondly, three out of four cases in the 
cluster were seated six to seven rows from the index 
case. Furthermore, when PHE contacted the airline to 
obtain passenger information, the airline was initially 
unwilling to release passenger details, despite assur-
ances and regulations [29]. This hampered the targeted 
contact tracing as part of the public health investiga-
tion and response. Sending an email or text message 
to all potential exposed crew and passengers, rather 
than row by row as recommended in the RAGIDA guide-
lines, may be more feasible. This method, adopted 
by PHE when they are able to obtain the information 
in a timely manner from an airline, serves not only to 
rapidly identify vulnerable groups but also to remind 
those who are unvaccinated to receive their MMR vac-
cine. Early identification of potentially exposed cases 
could have limited further community spread. There 
is therefore a need for an efficient method to obtain 
passenger information and contact details that can be 
globally adopted by airline companies and enforced 
by their regulatory authorities. Additionally, by rapidly 
contacting potentially exposed cases, public health 
authorities could provide appropriate health messages 
or interventions to prevent tertiary spread in the wider 
community.
Conclusion
This report highlights the importance of sequence 
databases in epidemiological investigations and 
shows how a global effort to update circulating mea-
sles strains could assist in identifying the geographical 
origin of importations. This is particularly important as 
many countries progress towards measles elimination 
and therefore need to demonstrate absence of sus-
tained indigenous transmission. Identification of clus-
ters, combined with rapid public health responses, can 
limit further spread. However, public health response is 
reliant on rapidly identifying exposed cases. Therefore, 
improvements in vaccination of airport workers, in vac-
cine recommendations to those travelling and airline 
contact tracing should be made, to ensure exposed 
contacts are rapidly identified.
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